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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a realistic and practical approach to quantitatively assess the risk-reduc-
tion capabilities of military counterterrorism systems in terms of damage cost and casualty
figures. The comparison of alternatives is thereby based on absolute quantities rather than
an aggregated utility or value provided by multicriteria decision analysis methods. The key
elements of the approach are (1) the use of decision-attack event trees for modeling and
analyzing scenarios, (2) a portfolio model approach for analyzing multiple threats, and (3) the
quantitative probabilistic risk assessment matrix for communicating the results. Decision-at-
tack event trees are especially appropriate for modeling and analyzing terrorist attacks where
the sequence of events and outcomes are time-sensitive. The actions of the attackers and the
defenders are modeled as decisions and the outcomes are modeled as probabilistic events.
The quantitative probabilistic risk assessment matrix provides information about the range
of the possible outcomes while retaining the simplicity of the classic safety risk assessment
matrix based on Mil-Std-882D. It therefore provides a simple and reliable tool for comparing
alternatives on the basis of risk including confidence levels rather than single point estimates.
This additional valuable information requires minimal additional effort. The proposed ap-
proach is illustrated using a simplified but realistic model of a destroyer operating in inland
restricted waters. The complex problem of choosing a robust counterterrorism protection
system against multiple terrorist threats is analyzed by introducing a surrogate multi-threat
portfolio. The associated risk profile provides a practical approach for assessing the robust-
ness of different counterterrorism systems against plausible terrorist threats. The paper
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documents the analysis for a hypothetical case of three potential threats. © 2007 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. Syst Eng 10: 273–289, 2007
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assessment; risk assessment matrix; decision-attack event tree; Monte Carlo simulation
1. INTRODUCTION
The “primitive need” or “want” [Sage and Armstrong,
2000: 100] for a weapon system may typically be
expressed by the customer as follows: We need a
weapon system that deters or else counters terrorist
threats by having superior capabilities for (1) putting
ordnance on target and/or (2) preventing opposing
forces from putting their ordnance on target. As systems
engineers, we want to translate that primitive want into
more specific, quantifiable system-level requirements.
It is not sufficient for systems engineers and designers
to specify and evaluate a system’s performance or ca-
pabilities only in terms of engineering metrics such as
response time, accuracy, or reliability. The deployment
of a weapon system is best justified in terms of its threat
reduction capabilities or in the military jargon its “op-
erational effectiveness.” Information such as the prob-
ability of defeating potential threats and the ratios of
inflicted to sustained damage and casualties maps tech-
nical performance to force-level combat outcomes thus
providing immediate insight into the value of a military
system [Bailey, 2000].
The focus of this paper is on the protection of mili-
tary systems from asymmetric attacks characteristic of
today’s fourth generation warfare [Hammes, 2004]. The
quantification of the risk reduction capability of protec-
tive countermeasures requires a vulnerability-threat
analysis in several activities and phases of any system
engineering design process. In the needs analysis and
requirements analysis activities, the vulnerability-
threat analysis provides the basis for translating the
primitive need into terms of required operational effec-
tiveness for countering terrorist threats. In the analysis
of alternatives activities, the vulnerability-threat analy-
sis is used to quantitatively assess the risk reduction
capabilities of different protective counterterrorism op-
tions. Terrorism risk and risk reduction can then be
expressed in absolute quantities such as the number of
fatalities, the number and category of injuries, and the
monetary value of material damage. Decision-makers
are then able to compare different options on the basis
of the absolute as-is vs. residual risks. This is in contrast
with multicriteria decision analysis variants such as
Mission Oriented Risk and Design Analysis [Buckshaw
et al., 2005] that assesses and compares alternatives on
the basis of an aggregated utility or value obtained as a
weighted sum of the system and attacker criteria quan-
tified in terms of utility or value.
Risk profiles and risk assessment matrices [Interna-
tional Council on Systems Engineering, 2004] are two
of the most commonly used graphical methods for
reporting and communicating risk analysis results. But
they have shortcomings. The risk profile provides the
spectrum of possible outcomes (monetary damage or
casualties) with each magnitude having its own prob-
ability of occurrence. The abscissa is the consequence
and the ordinate is the probability that a consequence
of magnitude x or greater will be produced [McCor-
mick, 1981]. The latter is also referred to as exceedance
probability [Paté-Cornell, 1996]. The use of risk curves
for decision-making is challenging because it requires
probabilistic thinking skills. The Classic Safety Risk
Assessment Matrix (CSRAM) based on Mil-Std-882D
[DoD, 2000a] provides only a limited view of mishaps
in terms of the probability (or frequency) of occurrence
and a point-estimate for the potential outcomes. Infor-
mation about extreme outcomes which is of critical
importance for making robust decisions for military
protection systems and safety systems is lost. Another
significant shortcoming of representing risk by a single
point on a two-dimensional consequence-probability
graph is that risk is often incorrectly equated to the
product of these two values. There is overwhelming
evidence that many rational people act on the basis that
risk depends more on the potential magnitude than the
probability of the undesirable outcomes [Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992].
Based on our experience, we think that the present
situation for critical decision-making under uncertainty
may be characterized as follows. When presented with
risk curves, the average layman is challenged by their
complexity and amount of information. In contrast, the
classic risk assessment matrix provides insufficient in-
formation to support the selection of a robust solution.
This paper presents a realistic as well as practical
approach to quantitatively assess terrorism risk and the
risk-reduction capabilities of protective counterter-
rorism options in terms of physical measures such as
damage cost and casualty figures. The key elements of
the approach are (1) Decision-Attack Event Trees
(DAET) for modeling and analyzing scenarios and (2)
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a Quantitative Probabilistic Risk Assessment Matrix
(QPRAM) for communicating the results. Section 2
provides a critical review of risk concepts and graphical
representations. Section 3 introduces the QPRAM as an
extension of the CSRAM to represent the possible
consequences of any mishap in terms of a two-sided
confidence interval. Section 4 reviews terrorist threats
and their unique risk aspects. Section 5 develops the
modeling and analysis of terrorist attacks using DAETs.
The approach is illustrated using a simplified but real-
istic model of a destroyer operating in inland restricted
waters. Section 6 addresses the problem of choosing a
robust counterterrorism protection system against mul-
tiple terrorist threats. It is conveniently analyzed by
introducing a surrogate multithreat portfolio against
which different design options can be compared. Con-
cluding remarks including areas for future research are
presented in Section 7.
2. STANDARD GRAPHICAL RISK
CHARACTERIZATIONS 
2.1. The Concept of Risk
Humans are intuitively familiar with the notion of risk.
It entails the probability of occurrence of a mishap and
the magnitude or severity of the potential outcomes. A
rigorous quantitative assessment of risk should answer
the following three questions [Kaplan and Garrick,
1981]: (1) What are the possible mishaps? (2) How
likely is each mishap to happen? (3) If a mishap does
happen, what are the possible consequences? This de-
mands the ability to think in probabilistic terms about
hazards and vulnerabilities. Risk is a complex subject
laden with traps that include judgmental biases, mental
misperceptions, and psychological elements [Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982].
The occurrence and outcome of events such as ter-
rorist attacks, acts of nature (earthquake, flood, hurri-
cane, lightning storm, etc.), industrial and personal
accidents depend on multiple complex factors (detec-
tion time, protective measures, etc.) characterized by
uncertainty and probability. Depending on the circum-
stances, the outcome may range from negligible to
catastrophic. Risk is then associated with a spectrum of
possible outcomes with each having its own corre-
sponding probability of occurrence. It can be properly
characterized by plotting the exceedance probability vs.
the magnitude of the consequence expressed in absolute
measures (monetary value and casualties). History has
taught us that focusing on “typical” mishaps can be
extremely misleading and short-sighted. Severity is a
strong psychological effector. Low-probability/high-
consequence events have therefore assumed a special
importance in risk analysis and decision-making.
2.2. Risk Profile
As background material, we first consider the risk of a
single-family house catching fire. Many fires are usu-
ally promptly extinguished and cause little damage.
However, depending on the conditions (occupants be-
ing asleep, no or inoperative fire and smoke detectors,
no or inoperative fire extinguishers, wood shingle roofs,
etc.) the outcome could be catastrophic, resulting in the
loss of life or spreading to other buildings [Roux, 1982].
Figures 1a and 1b depict a hypothetical but realistic
Probability Distribution Function (PDF) and the asso-
ciated Complementary Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CCDF) for the potential losses associated with an
“average” single-family house catching fire. The PDF
has a long tail extending into the heavy-loss regime,
which is characteristic of natural hazards, industrial and
personal accidents, and terrorist acts. Since Figure 1b
does not incorporate the frequency of the mishap, it
depicts the risk conditional on the occurrence of mishap
which is also referred to as severity (Mil-Std-1629A
[DoD, 1980: 9]). Statistical parameters are of critical
importance to the insurance industry. But to the im-
pacted parties, the financial damage of a house catching
fire has a specific monetary value and it is not given by
any statistical parameter such as the median ($30K),
most likely value (~$9K), or the mean ($38K).
We note that the above data are conditional given the
occurrence of a fire. To determine premiums, insurers
also require the frequency per year of a house catching
fire. There is an important conceptual distinction be-
Figure 1a. Probability distribution for the possible monetary
losses resulting from an “average” house catching fire. This
is hypothetical data modeled using a Weibull distribution
fitted to the following parameters: Location: 0, 50th percen-
tile: $30K, 90th percentile: $80K. [Color figure can be viewed
in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.
wiley.com.]
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tween “probability” and “frequency” [Crellin and
Smith, 1982: 2–20]: “…statistics, as a subject, is the
study of frequency-type information. That is the science
of handling data. On the other hand, probability as a
subject is the science of handling the lack of data.”
Statistical data of an average of 1 in 200 houses catching
fire per year equates to a frequency of a house catching
fire per year of 0.005 [Center for Educational Technolo-
gies, 2006]. There are additional regional, house condi-
tion, and resident specific factors that play important
roles in the probability of a house catching fire and the
severity of the consequences; but these are beyond the
scope of this paper. The risk profile in Figure 1c is
obtained by multiplying the probabilities of the severity
profile in Figure 1b by the frequency per year of a house
catching fire. Note that the range of the magnitude of
the potential losses has not changed. This is consistent
with the notion that risk involves both the probability
of occurrence of a mishap and the spectrum of potential
outcomes. If the probability of a mishap is negligible,
the associated risk is negligible; the severity, however,
remains unchanged. In the above illustrative example,
the expected loss per year of a house that catches fire is
$190 while the expected severity is $38K. Most home-
owners willingly pay a premium based on the expected
loss per year of $190 to be insured and thereby transfer
the risk of a fire to an insurance company. Given the
validity of the insurer’s risk analysis and sound business
practices, the latter is economically capable of accept-
ing the risk based on actuarial data, premiums, and its
client database.
An important property of the CCDF is that its inte-
gral from minimum to maximum equals the expected
value of the associated random variable [McCormick,
1981]. The area under the curve in Figure 1b equals the
expected monetary loss given that the house catching
fire. The area under the risk curve in Figure 1c equals
the expected monetary loss times the frequency per year
of the house catching fire.
A customary definition of risk Ri of a mishap Ei with
probability of occurrence Pi and mean consequence Ci
is [McCormick, 1981: 231]
Ri = Pi × Ci. (1)
Although Eq. (1) is extensively used to quantify risk, it
provides only limited insight into risk and its applica-
bility for decision-making is subject to sound criticism
[Haimes, 2004].
2.3. The Classic Safety Risk Assessment
Matrix (CSRAM)
Risk assessment matrices are widely used to charac-
terize program risks [Defense Acquisition University,
2002] and safety risk [Mil-Std-882D, 2000]. Given that
terrorism results in property damage and casualties
similar to safety risk, we consider the CSRAM shown
in Figure 2. The columns indicate the mishap severity
either qualitatively (Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal,
Negligible) or quantitatively (damage in monetary
value, numbers, and types of casualties). The rows
indicate the mishap frequency either qualitatively (Fre-
quent, Probable, Occasional, Remote, Improbable) or
quantitatively. We note that the label of “frequency” is
consistent with the Mil-Std-882D description of “mis-
hap probability” as “potential occurrences per unit of
time, events, population, items or activity” (Mil-Std-
882D [DoD, 2000: 18]). Figure 2 also depicts the DoD-
Figure 1b. Complementary cumulative distribution function
or severity curve corresponding to the probability distribution
in Figure 1a. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
Figure 1c. Risk curve for the probability distribution in
Figure 1a assuming a frequency of 1 out of 200 homes
catching fire per year. The damage is identical to Figure 1b
with the associated frequencies multiplied by 0.005. The
expected or mean loss per house-year of $190 is barely
noticeable. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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suggested quantitative guidelines for classifying risks
as High, Serious, Medium, and Low. It is important to
note that individual organizations should substitute
their own definitions and/or use other measures of
damage and frequency appropriate to the domain of
interest.
It is common practice to represent any mishap Ei as
a point on the CSRAM:
Ei ≡ (Severity, Frequency). (2)
When quantitative data are available for severity and
frequency, the risk of mishap Ei is then typically quan-
tified as the product of the frequency and severity in
accordance with Eq. (1). The frequency of a mishap
depends on its probability of occurrence, the time inter-
val, and the number of units. It represents the mean
number of mishaps per the specified time interval and
it may be greater than 1. For accidents caused by system
failures or external events the frequency can be com-
puted using available reliability databases [O’Connor,
2002]. The severity that appears in Eq. (2) is ambiguous
and conflicting recommendations have been made for
the “best point-estimate” to assign to the spectrum of
possible outcomes represented by the severity profile.
These include:
1. “Measure of the most reasonable credible mis-
hap.…” (Mil-Std-882D [DoD, 2000: 18])
2. “Worst credible consequence of a hazard….”
[Arnason, 2002]
3. “…“Worst credible” is a reasonable worst case,
not the worst conceivable case” [Kaiser Perma-
nente, 2002: 8].
4. Expected value of the potential outcomes
[McCormick, 1981: 231].
The first three definitions are vague and at best subjec-
tive making comparisons difficult and, given the state
of confusion, possibly invalid. Unfortunately, they are
still extensively used, which is indicative of a serious
problem with the practice of risk analysis. Only the
“expected value” provides a mathematically rigorous
and practical definition for a point-estimate. Consider
the example in Section 2.2. The risk of a house catching
fire assuming a 40-year life and no casualties or injuries
is represented by the point ($38K, 0.2). The expected
monetary value of the damage over the life of the house
is $7.6K. This is consistent with the fact that the ex-
pected risk for a period of 40 years corresponds to 40
annual premiums based the $190 figure (today’s dol-
lars). Using the CSRAM in Figure 2, the example house
catching fire is a Category 3A risk (severity: marginal,
probability: frequent). Consistent with the need for
tailoring the CSRAM as indicated above, another clas-
sification or set of scales seems more appropriate for
categorizing the risks of individual home fires.
Figure 2. Example of a classic risk assessment matrix adapted from Mil-Std-882D. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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2.4. Risk Profile vs. Classic Safety Risk
Assessment Matrix
For any mishap, the CSRAM depicts the probability or
frequency of occurrence and the expected value of the
possible outcomes. By specifying only the expected
value, critical information about extreme events is lost
and the CSRAM fails to provide a detailed view of risk.
Additional information is lost in Eq. (1) since it charac-
terizes risk in terms of a single number given as the
product of the probability and the severity values of the
corresponding CSRAM point. This further equates low-
probability/high-severity and high-probability/low-se-
verity events, which is a fallacy since, as discussed in
the Introduction, many rational people prefer to act on
the basis that risk depends more on the magnitude than
the probability of the potential undesirable outcomes
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1992]. This is especially rele-
vant when discussing terrorism risks. Given their expe-
rience, many rational people have developed a
commonsense recognition that asserted probabilities
are often wildly unreliable and become understandably
suspicious whenever they hear “Oh, don’t worry; they
would NEVER do that….”
For robust decisions, one needs to consider a more
general interpretation of risk than given by the CSRAM
and Eq. (1). Furthermore, the expected risk values of
low-probability/high-consequence events obtained
from experts using ad-hoc methods are highly prone to
error and have been shown in numerous cases to differ
from each other by orders of magnitude. Risk profiles
can be used to mitigate this problem because they
require the experts to focus on the spectrum of possible
outcomes, including extreme events. When hard data is
lacking, risk profiles can be systematically assessed
using the Direct Fractile Assessment (DFA) method
which elicits three percentiles (typically the 90th, 50th,
and 10th percentiles) from experts [Dillon, John, and
von Winterfield, 2002]. This avoids (1) the fallacy that
it is easier to provide a single point estimate than a range
for an uncertain quantity and (2) being trapped by a
false sense of confidence. We note, however, that, even
with major efforts, it is often not possible to identify all
of the possible mishaps or to have a sound basis for
estimating where the 10% and 90% limits lie. Nonethe-
less, experience indicates that it is well worth trying.
While we strongly advocate the use of risk profiles,
our experience is that laymen typically have difficulty
interpreting and using them for decision-making. To
address this issue, this paper proposes the QPRAM as
an alternative tool for comparing military counterter-
rorism systems and other risk reduction options. As
discussed in the following section, the QPRAM main-
tains the simplicity of the CSRAM while providing
some key risk profile data.
3. QUANTITATIVE PROBABILISTIC RISK
ASSESSMENT MATRIX (QPRAM)
The QPRAM is proposed as an extension of the
CSRAM to effectively provide quantitative prob-
abilistic information about a mishap’s severity and
probability (or frequency). We describe the approach
using the QPRAM depicted in Figure 3. The key fea-
tures are:
1. The consequence and probability axes are ori-
ented so that the farther from the origin a mishap
is plotted, the higher the risk. 
2. The use of a logarithmic scale on each axis. 
3. The mishap risk categories (High, Severe, Me-
dium, Low) are defined by isorisk contours, Rc =
P × C = constant. These are parallel straight lines
when plotted using log scales for P and C.
4. The expected risk of a mishap is depicted by the
point (expected consequence, frequency of oc-
currence).
5. The magnitude of any mishap is specified in
terms of the confidence interval [L(50%),
U(90%)] [Martz and Waller, 1982]. 
Figure 3. Example of a quantitative probabilistic risk assess-
ment matrix. The data points correspond to the 50th percen-
tile, expected value, and 90th percentile risks for
single-family house catching fire given the “as-is” condition
presented in Section 2.2 and a hypothetical fire control ap-
proach, Option A. The scales and risk categories correspond
to Mil-Std-882D. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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6. The frequency (or probability) of the xth percen-
tile endpoint is modeled in terms of the frequency
of occurrence of the mishap and the percentile of
the expected value of the consequence, xe, as
follows:
Freq(xth percentile) = (Freq. of occurrence) × 
(1 – x)/(1 – xe). (3)
Given that for a continuous distribution the probability
of any specific value is infinitesimal, Eq. (3) is offered
as a pragmatic approach to plot the endpoints, L(50%)
and U(90%), in the probability-consequence space of
the QPRAM.
The first two modifications to the CSRAM are
consistent with the Government Electronics and In-
formation Technology Association G-48 System
Safety Committee recommendations [2006]. A log
scale is especially useful for monetary losses associ-
ated with accidents, acts of nature, and terrorist acts
while a linear scale may be more appropriate for
casualties. Property 3 provides a convenient and rea-
sonable mathematical representation of the Mil-Std-
882 risk categories. Users may need to modify (1) the
probability and consequence ranges and (2) the risk
categories to effectively represent their specific cir-
cumstances. That is, the location and definition of
regions representing High, Severe, Medium, and
Low risk categories should be determined by the
organization that would suffer the loss. Property 4
provides a well-defined representation of expected
risk. Properties 5 and 6 provide key risk profile data
that are especially useful for mishaps with low-prob-
ability/high-consequence outcomes.
We propose the following procedure for developing
the QPRAM for any mishap:
1. If possible, obtain consequence data from de-
tailed analyses or past occurrences. Otherwise,
elicit the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the
possible damage or other consequences such as
casualties from experts using the DFA method.
Consideration should be given to aggregating the
opinions of several experts [Vose, 2006] as well
as using sensitivity analysis.
2. To facilitate the subsequent analysis, characterize
the severity profile using a realistic PDF. When
fitting hard data, the PDF should pass an appro-
priate goodness of fit  test [Hines and
Montgomery, 1980]. For use with the DFA
method, we advocate the use of the three-parame-
ter Weibull distribution because it is flexible
enough to fit three arbitrary percentiles [Ku-
jawski et al., 2004]. The triangular distribution,
because of its restrictive shape, lacks this capa-
bility. 
3. The expected value of the possible outcomes
(monetary damage, casualties, etc.) is obtained
from the fitted PDF.
4. The frequency of occurrence is assessed using
available failure-rates databases or expert judg-
ment. 
5. The frequency of occurrence of the mishap is
associated with the expected value of the severity
distribution. 
6. The frequencies associated with L(50%) and
U(90%) are obtained using Eq. (3).
The additional effort required to create a QPRAM from
a credible CSRAM is minimal. Steps 1–3 are necessary
to obtain credible estimates of the expected damage.
Steps 4 and 5 are necessary to obtain credible estimates
of the frequency of occurrence. Steps 1–5 are therefore
equally necessary for the CSRAM and the QPRAM.
Step 6 simply uses Eq. (3) to generate the additional risk
data depicted by the QPRAM. The curve connecting the
three points defined in steps 5 and 6 is a simple inter-
polation.
The data in Figure 3 labeled “As-is” corresponds to
the example in Section 2.2. It captures key information
of the risk profile in Figure 1c. Figure 3 also depicts the
risk reduction benefits of a hypothetical fire control
Option A, which might include stricter fire codes for
building materials and mandatory improved fire detec-
tion and protection systems. The probability of a fire
occurring and the associated severity are both reduced.
Figure 3 also illustrates that a single mishap can belong
to multiple risk categories and the limitations of using
single point-estimates.
We consider the QPRAM to be a valuable enhance-
ment of the CSRAM. It retains the simplicity of a
two-dimensional plot while providing critical risk pro-
file information for low-probability/high-severity
events. It can readily accommodate several different
mishaps and risk reduction options and thereby it pro-
vides a simple graphical tool for communicating the key
results of an elaborate risk analysis. Decision-makers
then have readily accessible quantitative data about the
possible outcomes which they can use to support the
selection of robust options.
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORIST
ATTACKS
4.1. Terrorism Risk vs. Safety Risk
Terrorism risk has much in common with the notion of
safety risk discussed in Sections 2 and 3. But there are
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some significant conceptual differences between those
that entail modifications to safety probabilistic risk
analysis methods. Acts of nature and accidents behave
as stochastic events; they can be evaluated using statis-
tics and reliability databases. In contrast, terrorist
threats are deliberate acts by adversaries for the purpose
of causing damage and casualties. To quote Woo [2002,
p. 8]: “Terrorists, on the other hand, are both subtle and
malicious.” New terrorist threats are being continu-
ously developed and will certainly be carried out if they
have the potential for high-impact whether individually
or cumulatively over the long term. The frequency of
terrorist attacks is therefore extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to assess. It requires “thinking like the
enemy” [Sheffi, 2005: 55]. The use of “red” and “blue”
teams is a useful approach to estimate the relative
probability of potential attacks and prioritize defenses.
There is much ongoing research on terrorism in psy-
chology [Horgan, 2006], game theory [Fricker, 2006],
security models [Bier, 2006], terrorist models [Gold-
stein, 2006], and other fields likely to provide valuable
insight into future terrorist attacks.
Implementing protection systems for high-value
units can have a significant impact on terrorism risk by
reducing (1) the probability of an attack being carried
out, (2) the probability of an attack being successful,
and (3) the severity of a successful attack. Decisions
dealing with terrorism risk also need to take into ac-
count the number of potential targets and years of
operation similar to the Mil-Sdt-882D safety risk as-
sessment of a fleet or inventory [DoD, 2000a]. It should,
however, be noted, as pointed out by Bier and col-
leagues [Bier, 2006], that the net effect is likely to be
less than desired since terrorists may redirect or refocus
their attacks. These are some of the reasons that, as
discussed in Section 2.4, rational people prefer to act on
the basis of the potential magnitude of the consequences
rather than asserted probabilities, especially when deal-
ing with terrorist threats.
Given the above issues, we consider it practical and
useful to characterize terrorist risk in terms of the con-
ditional probability of the attack succeeding, given that
it has been launched and the spectrum of possible
outcomes. The standard risk assessment methods dis-
cussed in Sections 2 and 3 can then be applied with the
following slight modifications: (1) “probability” is as-
sociated with the “conditional probability” that the
attack is “successful” given that it is launched and (2)
“consequence” is associated with the spectrum of pos-
sible damage inflicted upon the defending side. Since
this risk is conditional on the attack having been
launched, we refer to it as “conditional risk.” We note
that this “conditional risk” should not be confounded
with the “conditional uncertainty analysis” discussed
by Paté-Cornell [1999], who considers a family of risk
curves conditional on a set of hypotheses.
4.2. Risk-Based System Engineering
Approach
The design of robust and cost-effective counterter-
rorism systems requires a systematic approach that
includes analyzing target vulnerabilities and comparing
different options against a comprehensive set of present
and future threats. Systems engineering with its mul-
tidisciplinary focus is well suited to tackling this com-
plex problem [Mackey et al., 2003; Mackey, 2006]. We
propose the following nine-step process that is built
upon several previous models which consist of the
“secure system engineering methodology” [Salter,
Saydjari, and Schneier, 1998], the “six-step ship de-
fense analysis process” [Farris and Stuckey, 2000], and
the “seven-task methodology for integrating risk man-
agement and allocation of resources in antiterrorism”
[Parnell, Dillon-Merrill, and Bresnick, 2006]:
1. Identify critical assets for potential targets.
2. Analyze their vulnerabilities.
3. Characterize the adversaries:
• Identify a comprehensive set of plausible pre-
sent and near-term threats.
4. Define a set of distinct threats, referred to as the
design-basis threat set, for detailed analysis.
5. Analyze the design-basis threat set:
• Determine the conditional probabilities of
successful attacks
• Quantify the outcomes in quantitative meas-
ures such as monetary value of damage, num-
ber and types of casualties, lost time, etc.
6. Decide on the need for additional protective
countermeasures
i. If none required, stop.
ii. Else, proceed to step # 7.
7. Identify protective countermeasure options:
• Develop system architecture
• Develop concept of operations.
8. Evaluate the different options:
• Effectiveness and robustness of threat risk
reduction capability
• Risk of collateral damage
• Availability, flexibility, etc.
• Cost.
9. Select the preferred option based on the above
criteria.
All of the above nine steps are difficult and critical to
support a sound decision. Step 3 is arguably one of the
most challenging because this is where the unique
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aspects of terrorism threats discussed in Section 4.1
need to be addressed. Techniques such as setting up
“red” and “blue” teams and the use of facilitators en-
courage “thinking like the enemy” and help develop a
broad spectrum of perspectives. In Step 4, it is essential
to ensure that the design-basis threat set stresses the
functions of detection, identification, and deter or de-
feat for different attack types, environmental condi-
tions, and geographical locations. In Step 5 we advocate
using the scenarios developed in Step 4 to translate the
sensor and weapon performance characteristics into
operational effectiveness or risk reduction capability
measured in absolute terms such as casualties, kill/loss
ratios, probability of mission success, etc. For Step 6,
one requires criteria for decision-making. For example,
it seems reasonable based on the DoD risk management
guidelines [Department of the Navy, 2006] that a pro-
tection system should address all attacks with condi-
tional probability of success greater than 10% and
consequences with severity catastrophic or critical.
Robustness is a key criterion for the design and
selection of a protection system as specified in Steps
7–9. The “robust decision approach” advocated by
Lempert, Pepper, and Bankes [2003: 44–45] provides
a useful guideline for the design of robust protective
counterterrorism systems. The four key elements are:
1.  “Consider ensembles of large numbers of scenar-
ios.”
2. “Seek robust, rather than optimal strategies that
perform well enough by meeting or exceeding
selected criteria across a broad range of plausible
futures and alternative ways of ranking the desir-
ability of alternative scenarios.”
3. “Employ adaptive strategies to achieve robust-
ness.”
4. “Design the analysis for interactive exploration
of the multiplicity of plausible futures.”
In Section 6 we present a multi-threat portfolio
approach whereby the large number of plausible terror-
ist threats is reduced to a single composite threat. This
provides a practical and effective way to evaluate the
different options (Step 8) and ensure the selection of
robust options (Step 9).
The outcome of a terrorist attack depends on many
parameters such as the target vulnerabilities, the attack-
ers’ capability and strategy, the defenders’ detection and
response times, all of which are characterized by vari-
ability and uncertainty. Consequently, the resulting
damage is more accurately and realistically represented
by probability distributions than expected values. An
analysis based on a probabilistic risk assessment ap-
proach is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
5. DECISION-ATTACK EVENT TREES
(DAETs)
5.1. Modeling Attack Scenarios
Decisions and event trees include the notion of time
with events on the right occurring after those on the left.
They therefore provide a useful tool for modeling and
analyzing terrorist attacks where the sequence of events
and outcomes are time-sensitive [Martz and Johnson,
1987]. The outcomes of terrorist attacks depend on (1)
the actions of the attackers and the defenders which are
treated as decisions, and (2) the properties of sensors,
weapons, and target vulnerabilities which are treated
probabilistically. We choose to use decision/event trees
rather than attack trees or fault trees because (1) they
can better handle temporal relationships among events
[Paté-Cornell, 1984] and (2) they conveniently capture
attack and defense decisions and the probabilistic as-
pect of outcomes. To differentiate the battle-applied
decision-event trees approach from attack trees
[Schneier, 1999], we refer to them as Decision-Attack
Event Trees (DAETs).
Consider the attack on a destroyer operating in in-
land restricted waters by terrorists in a speed boat
loaded with explosive charges, as depicted in Figure 4.
The U.S. Navy has adopted a layered defense scheme
around ships that defines three zones for the rules of
engagement: assessment, warning, and threat [Depart-
ment of the Navy, 2006]. The probability of the attack-
ers entering the threat zone to cause significant damage
to the destroyer depends on (1) avoiding being identi-
fied as a threat by blending with neutral commercial and
recreational boats and (2) approaching undetected be-
cause poor weather and sea conditions reduce the effec-
tiveness of the ship’s sensors [Wagner, Mylander, and
Sanders, 1999] or limited operational status of the crew
and sensors. Time is a critical factor in the attack
scenario and its outcome. The performance of the sen-
sors and command and control systems and the re-
sponse time of the crew determine their ability to detect
and identify the threat in time to defeat it and mitigate
damage and casualties. The sooner the threat is detected
and identified, the greater the opportunity for multiple
engagements resulting in a higher probability of defeat-
ing it and minimizing the severity of the consequences.
Figure 5 depicts a simplified DAET corresponding
to the Figure 4 scenario. The DAET includes decision
nodes (square) and chance nodes (circle). Once the
attackers have selected the target, they are faced with
the decision of selecting under which visibility and sea
conditions to attack. This is represented by a decision
node and, for simplicity, three branches corresponding
to the following options: attack under excellent visibil-
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ity and sea state 0 or 1 conditions (denoted by Ex_Co);
attack under average visibility and sea state 2 or 3
conditions (Av_Co); attack under poor visibility and
sea state 4 or above conditions (Po_Co). We aggregate
the sequence of events to simplify the modeling of
detect, identify, warn, engage, and defeat the attackers.
The probabilities of detect, classify, deter, and defeat
for the different ranges and the damage values are
hypothetical. They are provided as a means to illustrate
the approach. Of special interest is the fact that the
Figure 4. Scenario of an attack on a destroyer operating in inland-restricted waters by terrorists in a speed boat loaded with
explosive charges. (Destroyer: blue; terrorists: orange.) [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
www.interscience.wiley.com.]
Figure 5. Decision-attack event tree for the terrorist attack
depicted in Figure 4 for three different weather and sea
conditions. The labels are as follows:
P1_T1: Scenario identifier where P1 denotes the shipboard
protection system Option P1 and T1 denotes a terrorist attack
in a speed boat loaded with shaped charges
Ex_Co: Attack under excellent visibility and sea state 0 or 1
conditions
Av_Co: Attack under average visibility and sea state 2 or 3
conditions
Po_Co: Attack under poor visibility and sea state 4 or higher
conditions
DE_Gt_500y: Attackers detected and classified at greater
than 500 yards
DE_500_300: Attackers detected and classified within 500
and 300 yards
DE_300: Attackers detected and classified within 300 yards
KE: Attackers are deterred or stopped before setting off the
detonation
NKE: attackers are not stopped before setting off the detona-
tion.
Each outcome branch is quantified by a probability (1st
number) and the inflicted damage specified by a Weibull
distribution with 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles in $M or
location (0, 50th, and 90th percentiles.)
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outcome consequences are modeled using distributions
rather than point estimates or abstract utility measures
[Haimes, 2004; Kujawski, 2002]. The potential out-
comes (outmost right branches) are modeled and quan-
tified using Weibull distribution specified in terms of
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles in accordance with
the DFA method; i.e. the damage of each possible
outcome is given by Weib(10th, 50th, 90th percentiles).
(When the minimum damage is negligible, the Weibull
distribution is assumed to have location 0 and the 10th
percentile is not used.) It should be noted that even in
those instances where a “kill” occurs, some damage
may result. The use of PDFs in DAETs provides a
powerful framework for modeling and analyzing risk.
The complexity of DAETs increases with the desire or
need for a higher level of fidelity.
Figure 6 depicts the monetary value of the ship
damage. The data is largely hypothetical with the one
exception being the use of the USS Cole attack data
[Perl and O’Rourke, 2001] for calibration purposes.
This was a dramatic event: 17 crewmembers dead, 39
crewmembers injured, serious damage with a repair
cost of about $250M in 2001 dollars, and an outage of
approximately 18 months. The DAET in Figure 5 can
readily be used to assess all these consequences by
assigning the corresponding values to the outcome
branches. The outcome is then given by a set of risk
curves corresponding to the inflicted damage, crew
injuries, loss of lives, and unavailability. The problem
of comparing risk curves is further compounded by the
challenging problem of dealing with different meas-
ures. One possible approach is to tie all outcomes to
monetary figures using some established scale [DoD,
2000b], thereby avoiding the introduction of abstract
utility measures. We consider this a political problem
outside the scope of this paper.
5.2. Quantifying Attack Scenarios
As discussed in Section 2.1, we think that risk is too
complex a concept to be quantified by a single number.
We therefore do not apply the “folding back” procedure
of standard decision tree analysis [Clemen and Reilly,
2001] whereby each option is characterized simply by
its expected value. Instead, we explicitly evaluate the
“conditional risk” profiles for the three attack options
depicted by the DAET in Figure 5. The results presented
in Figure 6 were obtained by performing Monte Carlo
simulations for each individual sub-tree (Ex_Co,
Av_Co, Po_Co) using Crystal Ball®. (We note that
these calculations can be performed using a number of
commercial software tools such as @Risk, Analytica,
TreeAge, etc.). The defenders face the highest risk when
attacked under poor visibility and rough sea conditions.
Alternatives to the DFA method based on high-fidel-
ity models are highly desirable to achieve greater credi-
bility. These include simulation tools such as the Naval
Simulation System, NSS21 [Metron, 2006] with capa-
bilities to (1) model the entire detect-to-engage se-
quence, (2) incorporate high-fidelity models of the
sensors, weapons, and humans, and (3) generate fragil-
ity or damage curves based on realistic structural mod-
els. However, these detailed analyses require extensive
efforts and are not well suited for analyzing the large
variety of threats and options that need to be considered
in support of needs analysis.
5.3. Comparing Counterterrorism Options
DAETs provide a useful tool for assessing the risk
reduction benefits of counterterrorism options. We con-
tinue with the scenario of the attack on a destroyer by
an explosive-laden speed boat detailed in the previous
section. But we now consider three conceptual ship
protection systems: “As-is”, P2, and P3. Option P2
consists of an improved detection and identification
system that results in a greater probability of detecting
and identifying the threat at longer ranges; all other
systems are “as-is”. Option P3 consists of an improved
gun-based weapon system that provides a greater prob-
ability of a hit and kill at short distances; all other
systems are “as-is”. The conditional risks of attack
under low visibility and rough seas given these three
options are depicted in Figure 7. Options P2 and P3 both
reduce the probability of a successful attack and the
severity of the consequences. The curves for options P2
and P3 intersect each other. Option P2 is more effective
at reducing the probability of a successful attack (22%
vs. 30%) and dominates option P3 for damages less than
$15M. Option P3 dominates option P2 for the low-
Figure 6. Conditional risks for the three attack options mod-
eled by the decision-attack event tree in Figure 5. [Color
figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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probability/high-consequence events because it pro-
vides a superior hit-kill capability for short distances.
For example, the 95th percentile damages for options
P2 and P3 are $35M and $30M, respectively. Although
option P2 dominates option P3 for approximately 90%
of the outcomes, it has the higher value for the mean
conditional risk, $9.3M vs. $7.9M. This is interesting
and valuable information; but based on our experience,
lay decision-makers often find it difficult to deal with.
As discussed in Section 3, the QPRAM provides a
simplified representation of some key risk profile data.
The QPRAM corresponding to the risk profiles in
Figure 7 is displayed in Figure 8. The risk to each of the
three destroyers given the scenario attack is depicted by
the following three points:
• P50 ≡ (50th percentile outcome, estimated prob-
ability of the 50th percentile).
• Pe  ≡ (Expected outcome, probability of attack
being successful).
• P90  ≡ (90th percentile, estimated probability of
the 90th percentile).
The estimated probabilities for the 50th and 90th per-
centiles are computed using Eq. (3). The curves are
simply Excel interpolations between the three points.
The data are less cumbersome than the risk curves in
Figure 7 and provide the decision-maker adequate in-
formation to make a sound decision. It is readily seen
that options P2 and P3 reduce both the probability of a
successful terrorist attack and its consequences. Option
P2 is more effective at reducing the probability of a
successful attack while option P3 is more effective at
reducing the high-consequence outcomes. With this
information lay decision-makers are no longer limited
to making decisions based on single points as provided
by the CSRAM. They can explicitly consider the ex-
treme outcomes as decision criteria and select robust
solutions thereby avoiding potential regret and disap-
pointment [Lempert, Popper, and Bankes, 2003].
6. PROTECTING AGAINST MULTIPLE
TERRORIST THREATS
A single scenario, such as described in Section 5, pro-
vides valuable insight into what a system needs to
protect itself against a specific threat. However, a single
scenario by itself is of limited value for choosing a
robust counterterrorism protection system. As dis-
cussed in Section 4, the decision process needs to
consider a comprehensive set of potential threats.
To proceed, we revisit the destroyer presented in
Section 5 and address the many plausible terrorist
threats that it faces. While the modern destroyer is a
formidable weapon system in the open sea, it is vulner-
able to terrorist attacks when transiting in confined
waterways, moored at pier side, or at anchor [Cobian,
2002; CNO N76, 2004]. Standard open ocean sensors
and weapons become ineffective due to the physical
environment, safety considerations, and local restric-
tions. Key vulnerabilities include systems that can be
Figure 7. Comparison of the conditional risks of the terrorist
attack depicted in Figure 4 carried out under poor visibility
and rough sea conditions against identical destroyers
equipped with three different ship protection systems. [Op-
tion “As-is” is identical to Figure 6 data labeled Po_Co.
Option P2 is an improved detection/identification system with
the following performance probabilities (see Fig. 5 for details
and labels): DE_Gt_500y = 0.5, DE_500_300 = 0.4. DE_300
= 0.1. Option P3 is an improved gun-based weapon system
with the following hit/kill at short distances: KE5 severity =
Weib(0, 5, 15), KE6 probability = 0.7, KE6 severity = Weib(0,
10, 20), NKE6 probability = 0.3, NKE6 severity = Weib(20,
80, 200). All other parameters are as specified in Figure 5.]
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
Figure 8. Quantitative Probabilistic Risk Assessment Matrix
corresponding to the risk profiles in Figure 7. [Color figure
can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
www.interscience.wiley.com.]
284   KUJAWSKI AND MILLER
Systems Engineering DOI 10.1002/sys
readily damaged by shock and fouling. The terrorist
threats include, but are not limited to:
• Seaborne surface threats such as speed boats,
suicide bombers on jet skis, or swimmers with
Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs)
• Seaborne submerged threats such as mines, tor-
pedoes, and divers
• Airborne threats such as manned and unmanned
aircrafts
• Shore-based threats such as rocket-propelled gre-
nades and pier-side IEDs
• Multiple simultaneous attacks.
For a ship protection system to be considered robust, it
needs to provide adequate protection against all of the
above threats. Otherwise, terrorists will in due time
identify vulnerabilities and switch their attack modes to
those that have the highest probabilities of success and
severe consequences. In the next section we present a
method for assessing the probability of the different
threats and selecting a robust solution by treating them
as a portfolio.
6.1. Multithreat Portfolio Approach
Consider a potential target and a set of n plausible
threats determined as discussed in Section 4.2, {Ti} ≡
{T1, T2, …, Tn}. Each threat Ti has a probability pi of
inflicting damage with a PDF Ci(x), where x is a random
variable that represents the damage. For simplicity we
define the probability of attack success as the prob-
ability that the attack penetrates the multi-layered de-
fense zones (see Section 5.1) and inflicts some level of
damage. The distribution for the attack outcome may
then be thought of as a generalized discrete distribution
associated with probabilistic branching [Kaplan, 1981;
Vose, 2000]:
Ti ≡ {〈pi, Ci(x)〉, 〈1 − pi, 0〉}. (4)
As discussed in Section 4, one cannot reliably predict
the absolute frequency fi of threat Ti. However, in order
to effectively allocate a constrained budget to risk re-
duction options it is necessary to estimate the relative
likelihood of the different threats. To proceed we as-
sume that the relative frequencies of different terrorist
attack modes are proportional to the probability of
attack success, pi, and potential consequences Ci(x).
The conditional probability of threat Ti given an attack
is then given by the following set of equations:
fi/fj = piCi(xth percentile)/pjCj(xth percentile),





fj = 1. (5b)
Equation (5a) represents the relative likelihood of each
threat and Eq. (5b) provides the normalization. Given
the terrorists’ preference for high impact threats and the
present lack of definitive data, we think that the use of
the 80th or a higher percentile is reasonable. This is a
variation of the Paté-Cornell and Guikema [2002, p. 9]
model, which assumes that the probability of a specific
attack type is “directly proportional to the expected
value of the attack scenario to the terrorists relative to
all other attack possibilities that they could consider.”
With Eqs. (5) the design of robust counterterrorism
systems has been transformed from a decision-making
problem under uncertainty (unknown probabilities) to
a decision-making problem under risk (known prob-
abilities). One may think of the set of threats as a
portfolio of threats given by a generalized discrete PDF,
Tp, which is built up as a composite of the individual
threat risks with probability values fipi and conse-
























We compute the Eq. (6) portfolio risk profile using a
Monte Carlo simulation where the output of each trial
is an event with severity Ci. The resulting portfolio risk
profile therefore properly captures the extreme out-
comes of the individual threats. As discussed by Vose
[2006], this would not be the case if one were to
combine the individual risk profiles by multiplying
them by their probabilities and summing them.
We propose to use the portfolio risk profile Tp as a
surrogate for the design-basis threat set. The complex
problem of dealing with multiple threats is thereby
reduced to a single composite threat. That is, instead of
comparing different design options against multiple
threats separately, a single comparison can be made
once a threat portfolio risk profile is established. Dif-
ferent counterterrorism options can then be compared
as described in Section 5.3. The approach is graphically
depicted in Figure 9.
We illustrate the proposed approach for the hypo-
thetical case of three threats, T1, T2, and T3. For sim-
plicity, we assume that each threat has a severity profile
characterized by a Weibull distribution. There is no loss
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of generality since the proposed approach applies
equally well to the hard-data risk profiles described in
Section 5. The three threats risks and the surrogate
portfolio risk profile given by Eq. (6) are plotted in
Figure 10. The portfolio risk profile exhibits the appro-
priate characteristics. As expected, the portfolio risk
profile has extreme outcomes with the magnitudes of
the individual threats, principally T1 and T2, but lower
corresponding probabilities of occurrence.
For completeness, we note that if one were to assume
a lack of information about the terrorists’ preferences,
one could model the conditional threat probabilities as
random variables using probability distributions such
as the uniform, Dirichlet, Beta distribution, or multi-
nomial distributions [Moskowitz and Tang, 2000]. An-
other approach is to use decision-making strategies that
require knowledge of only the possible outcomes and
not their probabilities. These include the minimax re-
gret criterion that is driven strictly by the worse out-
come [Sage and Armstrong, 2000] or the hybrid
Hurwicz criterion that weighs the best and worse out-
comes [Chicken and Hayns, 1989]. These heuristic-
based approaches have limitations and may lead to
irrational decisions [Hazelrigg, 1996]. They are not
appropriate substitutes for the use of models for assess-
ing terrorism threats and designing cost-effective robust
protection systems.
Figure 9. Process used to generate the threat risk portfolio by aggregating multiple risk profiles. [Color figure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
Figure 10. Example of aggregating three terrorism-threat risk
profiles into a terrorism-threat portfolio risk profile. The
individual risk profiles are assumed to be given by Weibull
distributions with location, 50th, percentile, and 90th percen-
tile as follows:
T1: PDF = Weib(0, $20M, $120M), p1 = 0.35.
T2: PDF = Weib(0, $40M, $100M), p2 = 0.45.
T2: PDF = Weib(0, $10M, $15M), p3 = 0.65.
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper develops a realistic as well as practical
quantitative risk-based approach for the justification
and selection of military counterterrorism systems. The
key elements of the approach are (1) Decision-Attack
Event Trees (DAETs) for modeling and analyzing sce-
narios, (2) a portfolio model approach for analyzing
multiple threats, (3) a Quantitative Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Matrix (QPRAM) for communicating the
results, and (4) risk expressed in absolute quantities
such as the number of fatalities, the number and cate-
gory of injuries, and the monetary value of material
damage. DAETs address temporal relationships among
events and are therefore well suited for modeling and
analyzing terrorist attacks where the sequence of events
and outcomes are time-sensitive. The multithreat port-
folio models the set of plausible threats as a prob-
abilistic aggregate of the different threat risk profiles.
The complex problem of dealing with multiple threats
is thereby reduced to a single composite threat. The
complex problem of selecting a robust protection sys-
tem is thereby reduced to analyzing a single composite
threat. By protecting against a set of plausible threats
rather than against a worst-case scenario, the defender
maintains the flexibility to protect himself against ene-
mies when they act differently than expected. This helps
avoid the decision trap of overconfidence in judgment
[Russo and Schoemaker, 1989]. We therefore advocate
the proposed approach which focuses on robustness and
flexibility rather than approaches that seek mathemati-
cal optimal defenses. The QPRAM is an enhancement
of the classic safety risk assessment matrix. It provides
confidence levels rather than simply point estimates of
risk while maintaining simplicity. Quantifying terror-
ism risks in absolute terms rather than abstract utility
measures facilitates thinking of risk reduction options
as insurance policies and balancing the threat risks
against cost and risk reduction. The paper thereby pro-
vides a useful approach for choosing cost-effective
robust counterterrorism systems.
We recognize that there are limitations to what we
have presented and that additional research is war-
ranted. We are looking to this paper as a springboard for
such research. In this paper we consider only a single
mode of attack per event. Even the concept of a “port-
folio of threats” is merely a compilation of several
attack modes all occurring separately. In reality, an
enemy could combine threats in “waves,” such as coor-
dinated subsurface and air attacks which arrive at the
same target nearly simultaneously. A high-fidelity bat-
tle simulation tool would then be better suited than
DAETs to produce the necessary damage curves. How-
ever, the final QPRAM would look the same as pre-
sented in the paper. We also limited the discussion and
example a to point-defense solution. In actuality, appli-
cation of command and control warfare, nonlethal en-
gagements, and other means to disrupt the planning and
preparation for an attack before its execution would
further reduce terrorism risk [Drozdova and Kunz,
2007]. The consequences of incorrectly identifying and
engaging a neutral or friendly platform as an attacking
enemy have not been addressed. The requirement to
avoid collateral damage is a significant design driver.
Further work will consider such occurrences.
Although the proposed approach is illustrated for
terrorist threats to a destroyer operating in inland re-
stricted waters, it can be applied to the protection of any
system, including infrastructure systems and threats
associated with accidents and acts of nature. We think
that the paper provides a useful framework for the
development and implementation of quantitative risk-
based needs analysis for a large class of protection
systems. Communication is a particularly important
aspect of risk analysis, and we propose the QPRAM as
a robust and straightforward means to represent and
communicate results and compare different risk-reduc-
tion options.
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